Abstract. In an organizational context the norms that apply to an agent depend on the roles he holds in the organization. The deontic characterization of structural roles is defined when the organization is created. But an organization is not a static entity. Among the dynamic phenomena that occur in an organization there are interactions between agents consisting in a transference of obligations or permissions from an agent to another. These kind of interactions are called delegation. In this paper we analyze different ways in which delegation occurs in an organizational context. We argue that the concept of "agent in a role" is relevant to understand delegation. A deontic and action modal logic is used to specify this concept.
Introduction
In an organizational context, agents' behavior are ruled through norms defined by the organization. By norms we mean obligations, permissions, prohibitions or other deontic attributes. The norms that apply to an agent depend on the roles he holds in the organization. The deontic characterization of a role of the structure of an organization (structural role) is defined when the organization is created and is part of its identity. But an organization is not a static entity: it interacts with the external world (e.g. establishing contracts with other agents) and the agents that hold roles in its structure interact with each other. Among the dynamic phenomena that occur in an organization there are interactions between agents consisting in a transference of obligations, permissions, responsibilities, powers or other normative attributes, from an agent to another, or to be precise, from an agent in a role to other agents in roles. These transferences may be temporary or permanent, and correspond to a sort of redistribution of competences, temporary in many cases, that may change the organization way of working but do not change its identity.
These kind of interactions are usually called delegation. Delegation is a complex concept, having multiple interpretations depending on the context where it is used. Several authors have addressed this issue, like [5] , [12] , [13] , [4] , [18] , among others.
With this paper we want to contribute to the understanding of this concept, analyzing different ways in which delegation occurs. We focus the study in a rolebased organizational context, taking organizations as normative systems (set of interacting agents whose behavior is ruled by norms). A role-based organization has a stable structure consisting of a set of roles, whose deontic characterization is described by a set of obligations, permissions or prohibitions. Within this context, agents always act in some role.
A delegation relationship may be established between agents holding roles of the organization structure or between agents inside the organization and agents outside of the organization.
We do not analyze motivations of agents to enter in a delegation relationship, nor the success or failure of delegation. We do not consider, either, informal or implicit delegation. We are interested in explicit and formal delegation relationships, where the agents involved are aware of the relationship, as well as all the agents that interact with them.
In this paper we will show how the delegation concept can be clarified in a role-based organization, using a deontic and action logic to express its different meanings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we briefly summarize the deontic and action logic we will use to formally express the concepts analyzed. Next we present the formal model we adopt for organizations, based on this logic. Then we discuss the concept of delegation and how it could be expressed in the formal model proposed. We conclude with the discussion of further logical principles in order to deal with delegation in a role-based organization.
Action and deontic logic
Following the tradition initiated by Kanger ([9] , [10] ), Pörn ([15] , [16] ) and Lindahl [11] , and followed by many others, of combining deontic and action logics to describe social interaction and complex normative concepts, a logical framework has been proposed by Pacheco and Carmo ([2] , [14] ) that tries to capture the notion of action of an agent playing a role. To know the role an agent is playing when he acts is crucial to analyze the deontic classification of the action (e.g. is it a permitted action?) and the effects of the action (e.g on action of other agents, or legal effects -obligations resultant from the action). It was proposed a new action operator of the form E a:r (for a an agent and r a role), being expressions of the form E a:r ψ read as agent a, playing the role r, brings it about that ψ. These actions operators were combined with personal deontic operators in order to express obligations and permissions of agents in roles (O a:r ψ -read as agent a is obliged to bring about ψ by acting in role r; P a:r ψ -read as agent a is permitted to bring about ψ when acting in role r). In [2] and [14] it is discussed if these operators should be primitive or derived from impersonal deontic opera-tors and action operators (e.g. O a:r ψ def = OE a:r ψ). Here we omit that discussion and adopt O a:r and P a:r as primitives, and define F a:r as ¬P a:r .
This logic has been used as the formal support to the specification and analysis of role-based organizations. In this paper we will use it to discuss the concept of delegation in the same organizational context.
Next, we will present the main features of the logic proposed in [2] and [14] , in a simplified way and omitting reference to the underlying semantics.
2.1
The logic L DA : formal language L DA is a modal (deontic and action) first-order many-sorted language. The nonmodal component of L DA is used to express factual descriptions, and properties and relationships between agents. It contains a finite number of sorts, not related with agents or roles, and three special sorts: Ag (the agent sort), R (the role sort) and AgR (the agent in a role sort).
As usual, for each of these sorts we assume an infinite number of variables, and possibly some constants. (We are not considering for the moment variables of the sort AgR). There may be functions between these sorts, but we do not consider any function with Ag as co-domain (the terms of sort Ag are either variables or constants.). The terms of each of these sorts are defined as usual.
L DA also contains a finite number of role generators, generically denoted by rg,of sort (→ R). There is always a role generator, denoted by itself. Moreover, for each role generator rg, there exists a predicate ( qualification predicate), denoted by is-rg of sort (Ag) and denotes a property that an agent may have.
The terms of the sorts R and AgR are built as follows:
(i) If rg is of sort (→ R), then rg() is a term of sort R (we will write rg, instead of rg());
(ii) If t is a term of sort Ag and r is a term of sort R, then t : r is a term of sort AgR.
From now on, we use r, r 1 , . . ., to generically refer to roles, and a, a 1 , . . ., to generically refer to a term of sort Ag (either a constant and a variable), and we will continue using t, t 1 , . . ., to generically refer to terms of the appropriate sorts. Finally, a : a is used as an abbreviation of a:itself, and qual(a : rg) is an abbreviation of is-rg(a), and intuitively means that agent a is qualified to play the role rg.
The formulas of L DA are inductively defined as follows: (i) if p is a predicate symbol of sort (s 1 , . . . , s n ) and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms of sort s 1 , . . . , s n , then p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an atomic formula;
(ii) if B is a formula, then ¬B is a formula; (iii) if B 1 and B 2 are formulas, then (B 1 ∧ B 2 ) is a formula; (iv) if B is a formula and x s is a variable of sort s, then (∀ x s )B is a formula; (v) if B is a formula and a : r is a term of sort AgR, then E a:r B, O a:r B and P a:r B are formulas.
The other standard logical connectives (∨, → and ↔) and the existential quantifiers are introduced through the usual abbreviation rules, and parentheses may be omitted assuming the following priorities: first ∧; then ∨; and finally → and ↔. The forbidding operator is defined as follows: F a:r B abv = ¬P a:r B
Axiomatization of L DA
The logical principles satisfied by the proposed operators have been discussed and presented in [2] and [14] . Here we just list some of those principles.
Naturally, we assume that all tautologies are axioms of our logic, and that we have the rule of Modus Ponens (in the sense that the set of theorems of our logic is closed under Modus Ponens).
With respect to the first-order component, we have the general properties of quantifiers. We have the generalization rule (if B then (∀ x )B), and the following axioms (schema):
for t a constant of sort s or a variable x1 such that x does not occur free in B within the scope of (∀x 1 ).
(B[x s f ree/t] denotes the formula we obtain when we replace (in B) the free occurrences of x s by t.)
The formal properties of the action operator E a:r are described bellow:
With respect to the formal properties of the deontic operators, and of the relationships between each other and with the action operator, we consider the following axioms and proof-rules:
More details can be found in the above referred papers.
3 Formal specification of role-based organizations
Organizations as institutional agents
Organizations are legally classified as artificial persons. Artificial persons are collective entities that have a real existence in human societies: they have juridical personality, which means that may be the subject of obligations or rights and they also have legal qualification, which means that they can exercise their rights and be responsible for the unfulfillment of their obligations. Based on this legal concept of artificial person, we introduced in [14] the concept of institutional agent to model organizations.
Institutional agents are agents. They interact in the society like any other agent: they can establish contracts or other normative relationships with other agents, they can hold roles, they may be the subject of obligations or other normative attributes, and may be responsible for the nonfulfilment of obligations or other "non ideal" situations.
An institutional agent has a structure formed by a set of roles. Each structural role is deontically characterized by a set of obligations, permissions, or other normative attributes. This abstract structure is supported by other agents: the holders of the roles. When an agent act in a role, his behavior will be evaluated according to the deontic characterization of the role he is playing.
An institutional agent is not capable of direct action. It always act through the holders of the roles of its structure. There must be defined how obligations of an institutional agent are transmitted to the roles of its structure (and indirectly to the holders of those roles), stating who is responsible for fulfilling them. It must be also defined what are the representative roles of the institutionalized agent, stating who is authorized to act on behalf of the institutional agent.
An agent may hold several roles.
Some extensions to the logic
Next we extend the logic in order to obtain a framework with the adequate expressive power to specify organizations as institutional agents.
Deontic characterization of roles and agents in roles
The deontic characterization of a role in an organization is part of the identity of the organization and does not depend on the agent that hold that role in a particular moment.
To capture this idea, deontic notions are attached to roles, but they are actually interpreted as applied to the holders of such roles, when acting in such roles (deontic notions are only meaningful when applied to agents). Thus, we do not introduce new operators, but just new abbreviations:
Apart from the set of obligations, permissions and prohibitions that are intrinsic to the role and characterize the identity of the organization, other obligations or permissions may be attributed to the role dynamically, resultant from the interaction of the organization with the external world. For instance, when an organization i has an obligation ψ resultant from a contract established with other agent, that obligation will have to be transmitted to specific roles of the organization's structure, stating who is responsible for its fulfillment (on behalf of the organization):
(for r a structural role). By knowing the qualifications of an agent, that is, the roles the agent holds, we know what are the obligations, the permissions and the prohibitions that apply to him. But there are situations where the deontic characterization of an agent may be more complex.
A first case, happens when an agent establishes a contract with an organization accepting to hold a particular role of its structure. In most cases (e.g. collective labor contract) the agent, by accepting to hold a role, just inherits the deontic characterization of the role. But, in other cases, other obligations or permissions may be attributed to the agent in that role, distinct from the ones of the deontic characterization of the role. For example, an administrator may negotiate with a company to have his personal phone bills payed by the company; or an employee of a foreign company that has to work abroad, may negotiate with the company to have some compensation (e.g. take his family with him, pay for children school). These obligations will be called personal obligations in a role, represented by O a:r ψ (where a is an agent and r is a role) and are not intrinsic to the role.
Representative roles Some roles may be classified as representative roles of other agents. This means that the holders of those roles may act on behalf of the represented agents within the scope of representation defined for those roles.
In order to represent this, the following notation has been introduced in [14] : r:REP(a, B), that is read as follows: "r is a representative role of a with scope of representation B". The expression r:REP(a, B) can be seen as an abbreviation of:
(∀ x )(E x:r B → E a:a B).
Here we extend this notation allowing the represented agent to be in a role other them the role itself. So we have:
We can now add two properties imposing that B should be in the scope of r2 and in the scope of r1:
When an agent acts as representative of another agent he does not act on his own behalf. So, it is natural to impose that:
There might exist cases where we can consider that a role r1 is a representative role of an agent a in a role r2, for everything permitted in r1. Using r1 : REP (a : r2, * ) to denote that, we can capture such situation by imposing the following axiom: r1 : REP (a : r2, * ) ∧ P r1 B → r1 : REP (a : r2, B)
Representative roles are crucial for organizations because an organization cannot act directly -it needs other agents to act on his behalf. Those agents are the titular of the representative roles.
Representative roles are not necessarily roles of the structure of an institutionalized agent. They may result from contracts or other normative relations that agents are free to establish between each other. An institutionalized agent, for instance, may also establish arbitrary representation contracts with other agents attributing to them representative roles for specific situations. Contracts are discussed below.
Contracts
Agents in a society are free to establish arbitrary normative relationships between each other. A particular kind of those relationships are contracts.
When two agents 4 establish a contract between each other, they attribute obligations, permissions and prohibitions to each other. They may also attribute roles (contractual roles) to each other and deontically characterize those roles (that means, they define what are the obligations, permissions or prohibitions associated to each role). Some of the roles may be classified as representative roles of one of the agents. In that case, it must be also defined in the contract, the scope of representation for that role.
Frequently, contracts also include conditional obligations (or conditional permissions). In particular, in legal contracts it is usual to include conditional obligations describing the effects of the fulfillment or violation(unfulfillment) of other obligations in the contract. For instance, besides an obligation O x:r1 A on x a contract C(x, y) may include an obligation on y on the condition that x fulfills the previous obligation E x:r1 A → O y:r2 B, or another obligation on x if he does not fulfill it
Using Ci(x, y) to denote (the content of) a contract between agents x and y, we may now represent some examples.
A first example is a contract where agents attribute roles to each other, define in the contract the deontic characterization of the two roles, classify one of the roles as a representative role of the other agent and define a conditional obligation on one of the agents:
A second example is a titularity contract, where agent a accepts to hold role r in the organization i. The deontic characterization of the role r is not defined in this contract. It is defined in the organization and is inherited by agent a because he will become holder of r. However, the contract also assigns additional personal obligations and permissions to agent a in role r:
Finally, an example of a contract established by two agents a and b, where no roles are attributed to each other. So, the obligations and permissions are assigned to each agent in the role of itself:
Specification of organizations and societies of agents
A formal model for organizations based on the concepts we have formalized above, can now be presented.
The specification of an organization involves a name, i, and a structure:
R i : a set of roles -structural roles of the organization. It is constituted by a finite set of atomic formulas of the form is-role-str(r, i), stating that the role r is a role of the structure of the organization i. DCR i : the deontic characterization of each role -obligations, permissions or prohibitions that are intrinsic to the role. It is a (finite) set of formulas of the form O r A, P r A or F r A, where r is a structural role of the organization i. T O i : transmission of obligations from the organization to specific roles of its structure. It is formed by a set of formulas of the form O i:itself A → O r A (for r a role of the structure of i).
RER i : contains information about the representative roles of the organization and its respective scope of representation. It is constituted by a set of formulas of the form r : REP (i : i, B).
The specification of an organization i may also include other components, not considered here. The description of < i, ST i > contains those aspects that do not change and define the identity of the organization. We need also to include in the specification of i, information describing the agents that in the present moment hold the roles r of the structure of i. Since this component corresponds to relationships between i and other agents (contracts that i establishes with each agent), we have decided to include it in component N R (normative relationships) of the specification of the society of agents (see below).
A society of agents, SA, is: SA =< IA, nIA, N R, GK > where:
IA : Specification of each institutionalized agent (organization) of the society. So it is formed by a set of pairs < x, ST x >, as explained above. nIA : The component nIA contains the identification of the other agents that exist in the society. N R : Contains normative relationships that agents have established between each other, and in particular the contracts that are actually in force. Contracts between organizations and agents, attributing to the agents titularity of roles of its structure, are also included in this component. GK : Contains general knowledge about the society.
For more details and an example see [14] .
Delegation
The concept of delegation appears in many different contexts having distinct interpretations. Next we discuss some possible interpretations of it, and try to express them in a precise way using the action and deontic logic presented above. This formalization process may contribute to clarify the concept of delegation.
What do we mean by delegation?
We can classify as delegation a set of different situations, all having in common some kind of transference of tasks, responsibilities, permissions, obligations, powers or other normative attributes, from one agent to another. The different interpretations of the concept depend on issues like: why agents delegate, how do they delegate, what is delegated, among others.
An agent may want to delegate e.g. an obligation to other agent because he is not capable of fulfilling it (e.g. he does not have resources nor knowledge), he has not practical possibility of fulfilling it (e.g. he cannot be in two places at the same time), or any other reason.
In this paper we will not analyze why an agent delegates or why an agent accepts a delegated task, obligation, or other normative attribute. It is outside the scope of this paper to express and reason about motivations or intentions of agents involved in a delegation relationship. We also assume, without representing it explicitly, that when an agent delegates an obligation to another agent, he also transfers to that agent all the resources required to the effective fulfillment of the obligation.
Lets discuss now what may be delegated and how this delegation may occur.
Delegation as a normative relationship First of all, we consider that delegation is a normative relationship between agents, or to be more precise, between agents playing roles. By this we mean that, agents do not simply delegate tasks, but delegate obligations, permissions, prohibitions, responsibilities, powers, ... to do tasks. For instance, if we simply say that the director of the Informatics Department delegates the task of writing the annual report to his secretary, what we usually mean is that she has the obligation of writing the annual report on behalf of the director. But that information is not explicit in the initial statement.
Another example: if we say that a company X delegates in a specific administrator the task of selling a property, do we mean that that administrator has permission to sell the property, or that he is obliged to sell it, or ...? The intended meaning is not clear.
On the other hand, if we say that a company X delegates in a specific administrator the obligation to sell a property, the meaning is clearer . Considering agents in roles instead of only agents is important, because as we will see, characterization of delegation depends on the roles agents are playing.
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For simplicity reasons, we use only the deontic concepts of obligation and permission, in the description of the content of a delegation act. 6 In a deeper analysis other concepts like the one of power should be included. The normative concept of responsibility is only informally and indirectly referred.
Thus, we want to express statements similar to: agent x delegates on agent y the obligation to bring about φ and the permission to bring about ψ.
What do we mean by this statement is not clear, yet.
A first remark that should be made, is that the agents involved in this delegation process, are part of some organization or some society. So, according to the perspective we adopt in this paper, they are playing roles (at least the role of itself). So we should reformulate the above statement: agent x, playing role r1, delegates on agent y, which is playing role r2, the obligation to bring about φ and the permission to bring about ψ.
This new statement poses some other questions:
-Is agent x (when acting in role r1), permitted to delegate the obligation to bring about φ and the permission to bring about ψ? -Is agent y (when acting in role r2), permitted to accept the delegated obligation to bring about φ and permission to bring about ψ?
The answer to these questions depends on the deontic characterization of the roles played by the agents. It seams reasonable to require that the obligation φ and the permission ψ referred, should be in the scope of role r1 (i.e. it should be possible to infer them from the deontic characterization of role r1). According to this interpretation, we can only delegate obligations and permissions attributed to us. 7 Here, we only consider delegation cases that verify this restriction.
We also assume that an agent cannot delegate the obligations and permissions he has in a role that are not intrinsic to the role (that are not in the deontic characterization of the role), but result from the interaction of the agent with the organization, such as personal obligations or permissions negotiated in the labor contract, or obligations that result from sanctions to his behavior.
When an agent accepts a delegated obligation (permission,...), this new obligation will be "added" to the deontic characterization that applies to him resultant from the roles he holds. Therefore, his actions will be evaluated in this new deontic context. But, in the model we adopt, obligations and permissions are assigned to agents in roles. Thus, a question arises:
Are the obligations and permissions delegated to an agent attributed to that agent in the role he is playing in an organization?
In most cases yes, but in some other cases no.
In the former cases, the delegated obligations and permissions are just added to the agent in the role deontic characterization. For example, when the director of Department of Informatics delegates on his secretary the obligation to produce the annual report, this new obligation will be added to the deontic characterization of the person playing the secretary role (O x:sec φ). This new deontic attributes are not intrinsic to the secretary role, they are resultant from the interaction between the holder of secretary role and the holder of director of Department of Informatics. In this context, it seems natural to impose that the delegated obligation or permission should not enter in conflict with the deontic characterization of the role played by the agent that accepts them. By not entering in conflict we mean, in this context, that the same agent should not be under the obligation or permission to bring about A because he holds a role and, at the same time, under the obligation or permission to bring about ¬A, because he accepts a delegated obligation or permission. For later reference, we will call this kind of delegation composed delegation.
There are, however, other situations where what is delegated is a set of obligations and permissions that should not be seen as an additional characterization of the role played by the agent who accepts them, because they have a distinct nature. In this cases, what is delegated may be seen as a set of obligations and permissions -a new role, as we will see below -that is attributed to the agent independently of other roles he is playing (although the role an agent is playing may be relevant to choose him as delegate). In this case, avoiding conflicts (of the kind mentioned above) is not relevant: agents may have conflicting obligations when playing different roles. For instance, it is possible to have O x:r2 A and O x:r3 ¬A. As an agent can act only in a role at a time 8 he will have to decide what obligation he will fulfill and what obligation he will violate.
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A typical example of this kind of delegation is when an agent in a role delegates some of its obligations or permissions to another agent (that may even be from outside the organization) through a contract, attributing to him a specific role. For later reference, we will call this kind of delegation independent delegation.
Role-based Delegation In the role-based organizational model proposed in the previous section, roles are characterized by a set of obligations, permissions and prohibitions. So, we can aggregate the delegated obligations and permissions in a role and say that agents delegate roles. This delegated role may be just an artifact (a way of aggregating obligations and permissions and naming it) or, on the contrary, may be a role of the organization structure (usually part of another role of the structure), or a new role defined in a contract. In this paper we assume that the roles of the structure of an organization are composed of smaller roles corresponding to functions or competences associated to the former role. Those smaller roles may be viewed as a way of structuring the set of obligations, permissions, ... that deontically characterize the role, into units that "make sense". For example, a lecturer at some university, has obligations related with his competence of teaching, others related with research, other related with bureaucratic functions, ... We will assume, in this paper, that an holder of a role may only delegate one of its role units. The deontic characterization of each of the role units that constitute a role, is defined in the structure of the organization. So, we don't need to deontically characterize the delegated role when two agents establish a delegation relationship. We shall return to this issue later.
In order to represent this role-based delegation, we introduce the following notation Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3), that is read as follows: "agent x playing role r1 delegates the role r3 on agent y that is playing role r2". Before we define the kind of formulas that correspond to the expression Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3), we need to discuss some additional features of the delegation concept.
If we assume the properties discussed above for what is being delegated, we may say that an agent in a role may only delegate roles that are part of the role he is playing: Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3) → r3 ≤ r1, where r3 ≤ r1 is read "r3 is part of role r1" (the predicate symbol ≤ will be discussed later).
In the context of composed delegation, the role r3 that is being transferred to agent y will now be "added" to the role r2 he was playing, in the sense that the deontic characterization of the two roles will be joined, as if there were a new role. To capture this idea we will use the function on roles, + : R × R −→ R (to be discussed later). We can say, then, that delegation makes y hold role r2 + r3. This is in fact a new role of the organization and its inclusion in the structure depends on the permanent or transitory character of the delegation. So, in the definition of the delegation relationship the following role attribution must occur:
As we said before, in a context of independent delegation this role composition should not occur. The delegated role exists by itself and the agent to whom the role is delegated may act either in role r2 or in role r3. In this case we must have:
Transfer of responsibility Another issue that must be discussed is whether the obligations and permissions delegated to other agents, stay or not in the role played by the agent that delegates them. We will consider two situations: share of responsibilities and complete transfer of responsibilities.
Share of responsibilities
In this case, the agent that delegates obligations and permissions, also keeps them. So he shares the responsibility with the agent to whom he delegated them. This delegation case corresponds to a representation relationship.This means that when an agents delegates a sub-role to another agent, he his assigning him a representative role. We can express this in our logic through the following formulas, for composed delegation and independent delegation, respectively:
In this case the agent y will act on behalf of the agent x.
Complete transfer of responsibilities
In this situation, when the agent delegates obligations or permissions he is no longer responsible for them. This means that those obligations and permissions are excluded from his role. The delegated role should be "subtracted" from the role held by the agent that delegates it. In this case, the role of the agent that delegates, is changed and becomes a sub-role of the initial role.
A possibility to express these role changes, would be to introduce in the language another function on roles: − : R × R −→ R (to be discussed later) and use it as follows:
But this possibility needs further research 10 .
For simplicity reasons, in the rest of the paper we will use Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3) whenever it is not relevant to distinguish the particular kind of delegation used.
Forms of delegating There are several forms of delegation. We will consider some of them: delegation by command, through a joint action, by institutional context, or implicitly.
Delegation by command
When agent x in role r1 has some kind of authority over agent y in role r2, delegation may be unilateral and have the form of a "command", which can be expressed as follows:
Ex:r1Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3). 10 Examples of open questions are: Should we cancel the qualification of x to play role r1?, or What is the meaning of having r − r?.
Delegation by joint action
Other frequent form of delegation is through a joint action, where both x : r1 and y : r2 decide do establish a delegation relationship. To express this joint action, we will use the action operator proposed in [14] , E {a1:r1,...,an:rn} , indexed by a finite set of agents in roles.
Thus, we extend our logical language L DA with this operator. The formulas of the extended language (L + DA ) are defined as follows: We consider that each joint action operator E {a1:r1,...,an:rn} is of type ETC, and the qualification axiom extends naturally to joint action formulas as follows:
We are now in position to express delegation established through a joint action :
E {x:r1,y:r2} Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3)
Institutional delegation
The several delegation situations we have analyzed are just particular cases of contracts between agents. So, another claim could be that: to delegate is to establish a contract with the particularities we have discussed. But this is not accurate. There are cases where delegation does not correspond to a relationship between the agent that delegates and the agent that accepts the delegated role.
Consider for instance a situation where an agent x that plays role r1 in an organization is absent. It is usual that another agent z (e.g. his boss, that plays role r) delegates on other agent (y that plays role r2) the role r1, until x returns to the organization. We can express this situation by E z:r Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r1) Sometimes these situations are predefined in an organization, and agent z might be the institutional agent itself.
Informal Delegation
We do not consider implicit delegation, in the sense of informal delegation relationships that agents may define between each other. Those relationships have no normative effects, in the sense that, if something fails, responsibilities could not be attributed to the agents involved.
Examples
So, we conclude this section presenting some examples of different types of delegation.
Example 1 One of the functions of the Director of Department of Informatics (ddi), a, is to produce an annual report (wr). Associated to this sub-role (wr) there is the obligation to write the annual report of the Department (ψ) and the permission to use the director's computer(φ). He delegates on his Secretary (sdi), c, this role wr. The role delegated is called wr and is a part-of role ddi. Role wr is characterized as: P wr φ ∧ O wr ψ The secretary writes the report on behalf of the director (i.e. her action will count as an action of the Director). He is still responsible for the report. Notice that this delegation has the form of a command (due to the authority the Director has over the Secretary).
Example 2 The Director of Department of Informatics (ddi), a, has the obligation to convoke the General Assembly of the Department (φ), once a year. He delegates this task, permanently, on the Assistant-Director (addi).
The role delegated is called cga and is part of role ddi and is characterized by O cga φ. This role is added to the role addi and subtracted from the role ddi. So, from now on, the agents a and b will hold different roles.
Example 3
The Director of Department of Informatics (ddi), a, will be absent and delegates in the Assistant-Director (addi),b, all his competencies.
The role delegated to b is now the whole role ddi. In the absence of the Director of Department a, b will act as his representative , for everything the Director would have to do or would be permitted to do.
Another possible interpretation of this situation would be to say that, during that period, b is the director of the Department of Informatics. The main difference between this interpretation and the one presented before, is that in this case, b would be the only responsible for his actions as Director of Department. While in the previous case, the responsibility also goes to a. In this latter case we would have:
5 Extensions to the formal specification of role-based organizations
In order to include the previous role-based delegation on the formal specification of organizations we need to consider further deontic logical principles related with the concepts of part-of-role, joining roles and role subtraction mentioned before.
With respect to the concept of part-of-role we introduce in the language a new predicate symbol ≤ where r1 ≤ r2 expresses the fact that r1 is part of role r2, which means that all obligations and permissions that characterize r1 also characterize r2. Thus the logical principles:
follow intuitively from what we want to express.
The joining roles function + : R × R −→ R also brings the need for the following logical principles:
that follow the idea that a composite role also inherits all the obligations and permissions of its role composites.
On the other hand, the subtracting role function − : R×R −→ R, introduces the need for the following logical principles:
OsA → ¬Or−sA PsA → ¬Pr−sA following the idea that role obligations and permissions no longer apply when this role is subtracted from another role (the main role). Note however that the other obligations and permissions remain in the main role, i.e.
OrA ∧ ¬OsA → Or−sA Or−sA → OrA Over and above the deontic principles we naturally assume role composition expressed by functions + and − as a way of expressing part-of-roles: Concerning the specification of organizations, our main idea is to specify organizations by roles r fragmented into smaller roles r1, r2, . . ., rn and express this by r = r1 + r2 + . . . + rn. Intuitively, each part ri of role r may correspond to a particular function (or competence) associated to role r. We will assume that an holder of role r may only delegate one of this units.
Introducing a predicate symbol = of sort (R, R), reflexive, symmetric and transitive, we foresee the need for the following principles:
r1 + r2 = r2 + r1 (r1 + r2) + r3 = r1 + (r2 + r3) r + r = r r = s → r ≤ s (r − s) + s = r r = s → (t − s = t − r) r = s → (t + s = t + r) r = s → (OrA = OsA)
Due to space limitations it is not possible to present a full example of an organization and of a society of agents that includes that organizations. Examples can be found in [14] . We conclude this section with some comments about the inclusion of delegations cases in the formal specification of organizations. We need to include a component in the structure of the organization describing the units that compose each role. Delegations that occur in an organization are included in the N R component of a society of agents that contains normative relations of the agents of the society.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we discussed the concept of delegation in an organizational context. We considered role-based organizations -organizations structured by a set of roles, which are held by agents. Moreover, organizations are seen as normative systems -a set of interacting agents whose behavior is ruled by norms (obligations, permissions and prohibitions) resultant from the deontic characterization of the roles the agents' hold. In that context, delegation is classified as a normative relation between agents, where agents transfer some (or all) of their deontic qualifications to other agents. A deontic and action modal logic has been used to express the different interpretations of the delegation concept. This is a preliminary approach to delegation. Many open questions remain.
One of the questions we intend to address is how to express the fact that not everything (obligations, permissions, powers of a role) may be object of delegation. There are some cases where an obligation (permission) must be fulfilled directly by a particular agent in a role. A possible approach would be to distinguish direct and indirect action, using, for example, a direct action operator like the one proposed in [17] , D x , and adapted in [2] to direct actions of agents in roles. Using this operator we may express obligations that may be delegated from others that may not, using expressions similar to OE a:r A for the former and OD a:r for the latter. If this approach is adopted, we have to use impersonal obligations and permissions instead of the personal ones we have used in this paper.
Another issue that needs further research is composition of roles. A formal study of the functions referred in the paper must be done.
Other deontic concepts must be included in the characterization of delegation, specially the concept of power and representation. See [4] , [15] , for work on this issues.
We are aware that, given its static nature, the type of logic proposed so far is not fully adequate to characterize the dynamic aspects referred in the previous delegation examples. There are in fact two relevant snapshots in the delegation process: before and after delegation. Before a delegation Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3) we naturally expect that agents x and y hold roles r1 and r2 respectively, i.e. is−r1(x) and is−r2(y). However, after delegation, the deontic qualification of both agents may change and as a consequence it may happen that ¬is − r1(x) or ¬is − r2(y). Obviously, these formulas together introduce a logical inconsistency. To overcome, this problem a possible approach would be to introduce temporal operators.
